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DISABILITIES
DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT
THOMAS P. MURPHY*
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act' (the "ADA") prohibits employ-
ment discrimination against qualified individuals with certain disabili-
ties.2 While there are a number of important distinctions allowed to reli-
gious organizations, the ADA does not expressly exempt such entities
from its provisions.'
Underthe ADA, a religious organization can give preference to indi-
viduals within that organization4 and can require employees to adhere to
* The author is a partner in the McLean, Virginia and Washington, D.C., offices of Reed
Smith Shaw & McClay, where he specializes in representing management in labor and
employment law matters. Mr. Murphy received his undergraduate degree in industrial
management from Clarkson College of Technology and his law degree from Vermont Law
School. He also served four years as an officer in the United States Navy. Prior to entering
private practice, Mr. Murphy was an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia. In 1985, he was the recipient of a Department of Justice Special Achievement
Award. Mr. Murphy is a member of the National Association of Manufacturers' Labor Law
Advisory Committee, the Chair of the Employer-Employee Relations Committee of the Ar-
lington Chamber of Commerce and the Hearing Committee of the District of Columbia
Bar's Board on Professional Responsibility, and the Co-Chair of the Labor Section of the
Prince George's County Bar Assocation.
1 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993)).
2 See id. §§ 12101(bXl), 12112(a).
3 See id. § 12111(5XB). Subsection 12111(5XB) lists entities that are exempt from the
Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"). Id. However, religious organizations are not
included in this list.
4 Id. § 12113(cXl).
[A]ssune that a Mormon organization wishes to hire only Mormons to perform
certain jobs. If a person with a disability applies for the job, but is not a Mor-
mon, the organization can refuse to hire him or her. However, if two Mormons
apply for a job, one with a disability and one without a disability, the organiza-
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its religious tenets.5 Another distinction afforded to religious employers
derives from the legislative history of Title I of the ADA ("Title I"),6
which encourages, to the extent possible, adherence to what is known as
the "minister exception" to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII").7 Title VII generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, or national origin.8 Following the "minister exception," however,
courts have consistently refused to apply Title VII to the employment
relationship between a minister and his congregation.9 Therefore, an
employment decision by a congregation with respect to the hiring, firing,
promotion, or transfer of its ministers is not reviewable under Title VII.
For instance, a minister cannot bring an action against his congregation
claiming a disparity in pay on the basis of gender. Thus, as the legisla-
tive history indicates, this doctrine also applies to disability discrimina-
tion under Title I of the ADA.
Nevertheless, there are several employment relationships created by
many of the Church's activities, including child care, education, and
nursing homes, that could become the subject of an action under the
ADA. This discussion addresses the ADA generally, and as it relates to
religious organizations. Part I describes the scope of Title I of the ADA.
Part II reviews the types of employment relationships that could fall
under the provisions of Title I. Part II discusses precautionary measures
tion cannot discriminate against the applicant with the disability because of
that person's disability.
H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 359.
5 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c)(2) (Supp. V 1993). For example, a parochial school can insist that
teachers adhere to a particular curriculum, adhere to certain religious tenets, and conform
their life style and teaching style to those religious tenets. The school can take disciplinary
action against the employee even if the employee suffers from a disability or claims that,
for some reason, a disability would interfere with adhering to those tenets.
6 H.R. REP. No. 485 (II), supra note 4, at 76-77, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 359.
Because title I of this legislation incorporates by reference the definition of
the term 'employer" and "employee" used in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and because of the similarity between the 'religious preference" provi-
sions in title VII and the ADA, it is the Committee's intent that title I of the
ADA be interpreted in a manner consistent with title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 as it applies to the employment relationship between a religious organi-
zation and those who minister on its behalf.
Id.
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-2000 (Supp. V 1993).
8 Id.
9 See id. § 2000(eX1). Courts have consistently interpreted Title VII to exempt a minister/
congregation relationship. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir.
1980) (stating "[o]nly the relationship between a church and its minister is exempt from
coverage of this subchapter"); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir.)
(holding Congress did not intend ... to regulate the employment relationship between
church and minister"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
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an employer can take during its hiring process to handle potentially dis-
abled employees without violating the provisions of Title I. Part IV ad-
dresses certain ligtigation techniques that attorneys dealing with ADA
claims should be aware of. Finally, Part V reviews the provisions of Title
III of the ADA ("Title III") that regulate commercial facilities and places
of public accomodation.
I. SCOPE OF TITLE I OF THE ADA
A Employers Subject to Regulation by the ADA
The applicability of the ADA is determined, in part, by the number
of employees in an organization or entity.'0 From July 26, 1992 to July
26, 1994, any employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce that
had twenty-five or more employees was subject to the ADA." After July
26, 1994, the threshold requirement was changed to fifteen or more
employees. 12
B. Remedies Available
Employers should be particularly aware of the remedies available
under Title I of the ADA. Unlike other .provisions of the ADA, Title.I
provides for a jury trial.". In addition, Title I offers various forms of
equitable relief.14 If, for instance, an employee brings an action against
an employer seeking some type of reasonable accommodation on the job,
the court can order the accommodation requested.'" If an applicant was
illegally denied a position based on a disability, the court can order that
the person be hired.' 6 If a person was demoted or denied a transfer or
promotion, equitable or affirmative relief can be ordered by the court.' 7
Also, both front pay and back pay are available under the ADA.'
As with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimina-
10 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 See id. § 12117; Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1981a).
14 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. V 1993).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 48, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N.
445, 471 (1990). When settling an ADA case or a Title VII case with a claimant to pay
compensatory damages, taxes are not deducted. If the settlement includes backpay, taxes
must be withheld. Employers' attorneys will, therefore, want the entire settlement amount
characterized as disputed compensatory damages. The settlement agreement should ex-
pressly state that the settlement represents disputed compensatory damages and the par-
36 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 1
tion in Employment Act,' 9 front pay is awarded when the court deter-
mines that reinstatement of a terminated employee is not appropriate.20
This may occur in a case where there is too much hostility between the
employee and the employer, or where other circumstances indicate that
equitable relief is not appropriate.2 In such cases, the court can order
not only back pay, which the employee would be entitled to retroactively
to the date of the court's judgment, but also front pay.22 As the term
implies, front pay is the court's determination of the present value of the
expected wages and benefits the employee would have earned had he or
she not been discriminated against.2" This exercise involves expert testi-
mony regarding the present value computation, which, fortunately, is
not treated as a jury issue in most circuits.24 Thus, inflammatory evi-
dence will not be put to a jury by an economist regarding damages suf-
fered by an employer's alleged discriminatory acts. Instead, this evi-
dence is heard by the court; in most circuits, only after the court has
determined that discrimination occurred and that equitable remedies
are not appropriate.25
It is also important for religious organizations to be aware of reme-
dial changes under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in EmploymentAct, and the ADA. Inaddition togiving employers.the. right to a jury
trial for any claims arising under Title I of the ADA after November 21,
1991, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 grants the right to compensatory and
ties take the position that taxes do not need to be taken out. The agreement should also
provide that, if taxes need to be taken out at some future point, the plaintiff is responsible
for any deficit and will be responsible for any fines or penalties.
19 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
20 See EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 763 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 946 (1985). "The power to grant equitable relief provided in the [Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act] clearly stands in addition to the monetary relief available .. , and
is expressly stated to be without limitation." Id. at 1172.
21 See id. "Reinstatement may not be appropriate... when the employer has exhibited
such extreme hostility that, as a practical matter, a productive and amicable working rela-
tionship would be impossible." Id.
22 See id. "[An award of future damages in lieu of reinstatement furthers the remedial
purpose of the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] by assuring that the aggrieved
party is returned as nearly as possible to the economic situation he would have enjoyed but
for the defendant's illegal conduct." Id. at 1173. See also Blim v. Western Electric Co., 731
F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, AT&T Technologies v. Blim, 469 U.S. 874
(1984).
23 See Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168-69 (1983). Courts take
into account "the availability of employment opportunities, the period within which one.by
reasonable efforts may be re-employed, the employee's work and life expectancy, the dis-
count tables to determine the present value of future damages and other factors that are
pertinent." Id. at 1169.
24 1&
25 Id
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punitive damages,26 though it caps such damages27 on a sliding scale
based on the size of a company or organization.28 The caps for compen-
satory and punitive damages are as follows: for a company with 15 to 100
employees, $50,000;29 with 100 to 200 employees, $100,000;s ° with 200
to 500 employees, $200,000;s 1 and with 500 or more employees,
$300,000.32
While these caps are an effective means of limiting potential liability
of religious organizations, they can sometimes be circumvented. Plain-
tiffs' lawyers will tack common. law tort or contract claims to the ADA
lawsuit. Because these common law tort claims are not subject to dam-
age caps, the jury will hear damages evidence they otherwise would not
be entitled to hear under the ADA. One of the common law tort theories
invoked over the last two years in the context of disability cases is "inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress," particularly with long-term em-
ployees who believe they can establish that their employer was acting
insensitively.33 If they can prove they were ridiculed because of their
disability, and that it caused them great emotional upset, they may have
a tort claim.3 4
"Interference with contractual relations" is another common law tort
claim that is often tacked on to an ADA- case.35 Other tort claims as-
serted include "wrongful discharge,"3 6 and "whistle-blower" exceptions to
a state;s at-will doctrine.37 Regardless of whether any of these claims
are meritorioua, or whether they could even survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, these are the types of variances an attorney
must watch for when defending a claim under Title I of the ADA.
An attorney must also be mindful of the provisions of applicable
state disability law. Prior to the passage of the ADA, many states had
"little ADAs." These acts basically provided the same protection that the
26 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a), (b) (Supp. V 1993).
27 Id. § 1981a(bX3).
28 Id
29 Id. § 1981aMbX3)A).
30 Id. § 1981a(b3(B).
31 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3XC) (Supp. V 1993).
32 Id § 1981a(b)(3XD).
33 See, e.g., Washington v. Runyon, 7 A.D.D. 764 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Patterson v. Downtown
Med. and Diagnostic Ctr., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Bishop v. Okidata, Inc.,
864 F. Supp. 416 (D.N.J. 1994).
34 See Patterson, 866 F. Supp. at 1382 (noting plaintiff subjected to idicule); Davis v. York
Intl Inc., 2 A.D. Cases 1810 (D. Md. 1993) (alleging ridicule and intimidation).
35 See, e.g., Bishop, 864 F. Supp. 416; Hartman v. City of Petaluma, 841 F. Supp. 946 (N.D.
Cal. 1994).
36 See, e.g., Brewer v. Peterson Realty Co., 3 A.D. Cases 1756 (D. Kan. 1994); Mannell v.
American Tobacco Co., 871 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Va. 1994).
37 See, e.g., Patterson, 866 F. Supp. 1379.
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ADA now provides. In Washington, D.C., for instance, the liberal provi-
sions of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act38 make it much eas-
ier to win compensatory and punitive damages. As a result, in many of
the ADA lawsuits in the District of Columbia, a state claim will be ap-
pended.39 Additionally, there are often local codes or ordinances to pro-
tect the disabled. For example, in northern Virginia, in addition to the
ADA and Virginia Human Rights Act, a0 some localities, such as the City
of Alexandria or Arlington County, have a city code or county ordinance
that prohibits discrimination in employment by entities doing business
in the locality.
Another way the plaintiff's lawyer will tryto get around the dam-
ages cap is by asserting, under the ADA, the "single employer" doctrine
of Title VII. Assume, for instance, a jurisdiction where each parish is
incorporated. An aggrieved person may hesitate to sue only the parish
for an alleged discriminatory act by the parish if damages would be lim-
ited because the parish has a small number of employees. The plaintiff
may then attempt to name the diocese as a defendant in the action and
claim that, even though the diocese is a separate corporation from the
parish, the diocese and the parish are considered a single employer
under most labor law statutes, including the National Labor Relations
Act or Title VII. ."
If the plaintiff or employee can prove a commonality between the
two entities in terms of management and control, then the court will dis-
regard these separate entities and find that they are, in fact, a single
employer for labor law purposes, much like the principle of piercing the
corporate veil. A principal factor the court may consider is the amount of
control the bishop. or diocese exercises over the school.4" Most parishes
are constantly struggling with the diocese for control of their schools and
activities. If the parish and diocese are deemed a single employer, the
plaintiff may be permitted to name the bishop or diocese as an additional
party to increase the damages cap. This same principal would be effec-
tive with regard to the application of the law in the first instance.
As indicated, the larger the number of employees, the higher the cap
imposed on damages. The legislative history of the ADA provides some
guidance by referring to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
38 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1981).
39 See MacNabb v. MacCartee, 804 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1992).
40 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342 (Michie 1985).
41 See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (6th Cir. 1983) (listing factors encom-
passed in "single employer doctrine"); see also Shepherdson v. Local Union No. 401, 823 F.
Supp. 1245, 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Brower-Coad v. Fundamental Brokers, Inc., 856 F. Supp.
147, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
42 See Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1338 (noting "control" is factor in "single employer
doctrine").
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case law developed under that statute for determining who is an "em-
ployee."4" To meet the threshold of employees, 44 case law under Title
VII says that both part-time and full-time employees are considered.45
Many organizations use part-time employees to avoid health insurance
coverage and other obligations. 46 Also, since the employer must count
the number of employees on the payroll,4 7 those people on disability
leave or workers compensation, if technically on the payroll, should also
be included. As a practical matter, once the fifteen employee threshold
came into effect,4" this issue became of lesser concern, except for some
smaller parishes.
II. PRovIsioNs OF TITLE I OF THE ADA
The fundamental basis of Title I is that it prohibits discrimination
against an individual with a disability who is otherwise qualified to per-
form the essential function of a job with reasonable accommodation.4 9
Several of the terms of this portion of Title I have left courts and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") struggling
for proper definition of such terms, including "qualified individual," "dis-
ability," "essential function of a job," and "reasonable accommodation."
Likewise, these terms and issues cause difficulty in advising clients:
when they are confronted with various cases of employees claiming to
have disabilities and a need for some reasonable accommodation.
A 'Disability"
Many employers have struggled with the definition of the term "dis-
ability" because the statute does not offer much guidance in this area.5 °
Generally, the confusion is not over maladies of a long-term nature;
rather, the struggle is over injuries or illnesses that are of a short-term
43 See, e.g., Norman v. Levy, 767 F. Supp. 1441 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (using hybrid economic
realities/common law control test to define Title VII employees); Vakharia v. Swedish Cove-
nant Hosp., 765 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1991); EEOC v. Pettegrove Truck Serv., Inc., 716 F.
Supp. 1430 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
44 See supra notes 11 & 12.
45 See Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904
(1984).
46Id.
47 Id.
48 See supra note 12.
49 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. V 1993).
50 See id. § 12102(2). Disabled individuals are broadly defined as individuals who have:
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) are regarded as
having such an impairment." Id.
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duration.5 ' A practical concern for potential defendants is the ease with
which plaintiffs can establish the existence of a "disability." It is imprac-
tical to dispute whether an employee really has a "disability," since the
test for what constitutes a "disability" is so vague and general. The ap-
plicable statutory definition provides that a "disability" "is a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities."52
EEOC regulations list broad examples of what constitutes a "major
life activity," including walking, standing, pushing, lifting, reading, and
working.5 3 In most instances, it will be easy for an employee to find a
physician willing to give an opinion that an employee is suffering from a
physical or mental impairment that limits one or more of their major life
activities: "This patient should not stand for periods beyond ten minutes
without resting for twenty." "This patient should not work or leave bed
for a three-day period." These types of notes are common in an employ-
ment setting.
A private sector or religious employer is not likely to successfully
argue to the jury that the plaintiff is not disabled. Other ADA factors
tend to be more amenable to an employer's arguments. For instance, an
employee may ask for accommodations which are unreasonable or would
impose an undue hardship on the organization. However, if an employer
does argue that the employee does not have a "disability," the best time
to do so is on a motion for summary judgment.
Another interpretive issue is whether short-term conditions, such as
broken limbs, a pulled back from a weekend softball game, or a twisted
ankle are disabilities within the meaning of the ADA. It is unclear when
or whether an employer must provide some type of reasonable accommo-
dation54 for an employee with a short-term condition. To assist employ-
ers in complying with the ADA, the EEOC has published the Technical
Assistance Manual for the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "EEOC
Manual").5" The EEOC Manual is written in plain language, and at-
51 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(jX2) (1994) (noting factor in disability is "how long it will last or
is expected to last").
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993).
53 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1994).
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. V 1993). "Reasonable accommodation" may entail
readjusting the disabled employee's work schedule, reassigning job responsibilities, and
maybe even assigning a helper. See Dutton v. Johnson City Bd., 859 F. Supp. 498, 507 (D.
Kan. 1994).
55 EQUAL EMPLOYmzNr OPPoRTUNITY CoMMIssIoN, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR
=mu AmEImCANS WITH DispAIaras Acr (1992) [hereinafter EEOC MANUAL]. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") was authorized under § 506 of the
ADA to prepare a technical assistance manual and make it available to interested parties.
42 U.S.C. § 12206(c)(3) (Supp. V 1993). The manual attempts to give guidance for ADA
compliance by offering specific examples and suggestions. However, the manual is not a
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tempts to answer an employer's most common questions regarding the
ADA. By using specific examples and offering suggestions, it provides
straightforward, practical guidance for ADA compliance.
The EEOC Manual states that temporary, nonchronic impairments
"that do not last for a long time and that have little or no long term
impact usually are not disabilities." It cites as examples: broken limbs,
sprains, concussions, appendicitis, common colds, and influenza, sug-
gesting these would not be considered disabilities. This is beneficial to
employers, eliminating the need to revamp sick leave and short-term dis-
ability policies or to reassign job responsibilities based on short-term
disability.
The EEOC uses the word "usually" because, in another example, it
provides that if a broken leg takes significantly longer to heal than a
normal healing period, and, during this period, the individual cannot
walk, the condition would be considered a "disability."5 6 Generally, tem-
porary, non-chronic impairments are not entitled to protection under the
ADA. If, however, the healing process takes significantly longer than
normal, or some unusual complication sets in, even a temporary impair-
ment may be considered a "disability." 7
Although "disability" is broadly defined in the ADA," the definition
was not intended to- encompass -all physical characteristics or common
personality traits.59 The legislative history of the ADA provides several
examples of disabilities including cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dys-
trophy, tuberculosis, mental retardation, cancer, emotional or mental ill-
ness, multiple sclerosis, HIV, heart disease, and diabetes.
regulation, and it is unclear how much weight courts will give to it. Those interested in
obtaining a copy of the manual can contact any one of ten federally-funded regional centers
that are providing ADA-related information and consultation. A uniform nationwide tele-
phone number, (800) 949-4232, is available for ordering the manual or any other ADA-
related materials.
56 The ADA regulations note that even a temporary condition, if severe enough, can qualify
as a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(jX2Xii) (1994).
57 Id.
58 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993); see supra note 50.
59 The regulations point out that physical characteristics, such as eye and hair color, left-
handedness, height, weight, or muscle tone within a normal range, and not the result of a
physiological disorder, are not disabilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1994). In addition, envi-
ronmental, cultural, and economic conditions, such as being poor or having a prison record,
do not qualify as disabilities. H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 4, at 51-52, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 333-34. Some members of Congress were concerned by the broadness of
the disability definition and expressly excluded certain conditions from the definition of
"disability." The act expressly excludes, homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism,
transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders, or other
sexual disorders. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(bX1) (Supp. V 1993). The ADA also excludes "compul-
sive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance use disorders result-
ing from the current use of drugs" from the definition of disability. Id. § 12211(bX2)-(3).
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The ADA has a specific section dealing with drug and alcohol
abuse.60 The ADA clearly states that an individual who is currently us-
ing illegal drugs is not a "qualified individual with a disability," and is
not protected by the ADA."' The term "currently" does not require the
employer to prove the individual illegally used drugs at the time of the
action. The act is intended to deny protection to an individual whose
illegal use of drugs has "occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable
belief" that the person's drug use is current.62 However, an individual
who has completed a drug rehabilitation program and is not currently
engaged in the illegal use of drugs is considered an individual with a
"disability" under the ADA. 6" If a former drug addict has been released
from a rehabilitation program, and is otherwise qualified to perform all
essential functions of a job with reasonable accommodation, an employer
cannot discriminate against that individual.6 4 For example, in a paro-
chial school setting, assume a reformed drug addict applying for a teach-
ing position is otherwise qualified to perform all the essential functions
of the teaching job, with reasonable accommodation. The diocese or
school board may, as a reasonable accommodation, have to allow the in-
dividual to leave at noon every day to go to a methadone clinic, to come in
a little later than other teachers, or maybe to leave a little earlier be-
cause he tires easily during the first six months after rehabilitation. 65
Only by demonstrating that this type of accommodation is "unreasona-
ble" and would work an undue hardship on the school can the school
60 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (Supp. V 1993).
61 Id. § 12114(a).
62 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3 (1994).
63 42 U.S.C. § 12114(bXl) (Supp. V 1993). The ADA's legislative history indicates that
drug addiction falls within the ADA's definition of 'disability." H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra
note 4, at 51, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 333.
64 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (Supp. V 1993). Because a rehabilitated drug user is
considered a "qualified individual with a disability," the ADA prohibits discrimination
against him in all areas of 'job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or dis-
charge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment." Id. at § 12112(a).
65 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The act expressly provides that "discrimination" includes "not
making reasonable accommodations." Id. Among the many terms included in "reasonable
accommodation" are "part-time or modified work schedules." Id. at § 12111(9)(B). Courts
have often required accommodations for disabled individuals who need medical treatment
that interferes with normal work schedules. See, e.g., Fisher v. Superior Ct., 177 Cal. App.
3d 779 (1986) (noting reasonable accommodation includes accommodating medical appoint-
ments during regular working hours). For a discussion of the criteria for a reasonable ac-
commodation, see Elliot M. Shaller, "Reasonable Accommodation" Under the Americans
with Disability Act, 16 EMPuL. REL. L.J. 431 (1991); Rosalie K Murphy, Reasonable Accom-
modation and Employment Discrimination Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1607 (1991).
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defend not providing the accommodation. 8 Alcoholism is treated differ-
ently from drug use under the ADA. Unlike the current use of illegal
drugs,6 7 the current use of alcohol does not automatically disqualify a
person from being considered an individual with a "disability." Under
the ADA, an alcoholic is considered an individual with a "disability" and
is entitled to protection. 8 As long as an alcoholic is otherwise qualified
an employer has to provide reasonable accommodation to that individ-
ual. This does not mean an employer has to tolerate an alcoholic who is
impaired on the job. The ADA expressly allows an employment policy
that prohibits being under the influence of alcohol at the work place. 69
Since the ADA permits an employer to hold an alcoholic to the same
standards and rules as other employees, an employer may discipline the
alcoholic if the alcohol use results in constant lateness, poor attendance,
or otherwise interferes with job performance.70 However, if an individ-
ual's alcoholism does not interfere with job performance, as an alcoholic,
the individual may be protected against discrimination under the
ADA.71
Another interpretive issue arising out of the ADA is the expansion of
the type of people protected as disabled. The ADA extends protection not
only to individuals who have a disability, but to individuals who have a
record of a disability. 72 An example. of this is an individual who has a
record of a heart condition, mental illness, or cancer.73 Employees who
66 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993). If the accommodation is unduly costly, exten-
sive, disruptive, or will fundamentally alter the nature of a program, it will notbe required.
H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 4, at 67, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 349. The ADA
defines "undue hardship" as an action requiring "significant difficulty or expense" when
viewed in light of four factors:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed...; (ii) the overall finan-
cial resources of the facility or facilities involved; the number of persons em-
ployed; the effect on resources; or the impact of such accommodation on the
operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered en-
tity; the overall size of its business; the number of employees; the number,
type, and location of its facilities; and (iv) the types of operations of the covered
entity; its composition and structure; its geographic separateness, administra-
tive or financial relationship to the facility in question.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (Supp. V 1993). See Evan J. Kemp, Jr. & Christopher Bell, A
Labor Lawyer's Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 15 NovA L. REV. 31,
59-62 (1991) (discussing legislative history behind "undue hardship" provision).
67 See supra note 61.
68 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (Supp. V 1993).
69 See id. § 12114(c)(1).
70 Id. § 12114(cX4).
71 Id. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a).
72 Id. § 12102(2XB).
73 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1994). A person is considered to have a "record" of disabilities if
he or she has a physical or mental impairment which at one time substantially limited a
major life activity, but is no longer so limited. Id.
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can establish that an employer has denied them certain promotions, job
assignments, or transfers because of a record of disability are entitled to
ADA protection, despite not being currently disabled. 74
The ADA also extends disability protection to people who are re-
garded as disabled, but-who are not necessarily disabled. 71 If an em-
ployer mistakenly believes an employee has a substantially limiting im-
pairment, and discriminates against that individual, the ADA protects
that employee.76 For example, consider an employee with the HIV virus.
A person in the early stages of AIDS may not be disabled as that word is
defined by Title I, but may be isolated because the employer fears a nega-
tive reaction from customers and other employees. The employee with
HIV may be denied certain job opportunities because of a stereotype that
the employer has with respect to the contagiousness of the employee's
condition. Though the employee may not technically be disabled, and
may be fully fit and able to perform all essential functions of a job, if that
employee is treated or regarded as disabled, he can seek protection
under the ADA.77
Discrimination protection also extends to individuals who are associ-
ated with someone disabled.78 If an employer discriminates against an
individual because that person's spouse or significant other is disabled,
that individual may have a claim against the employer undcr the ADA. 79
Again, this type of claim has commonly been asserted in the context of
the 1IW virus. For instance, employees may claim they are being dis-
criminated against by their coworkers or supervisors by the type of job
tasks or job locations assigned because they live or associate with a per-
son that is in the late stages of AIDS.80
74 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993). See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 4, at 52,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334.
75 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2XC) (Supp. V 1993). For example, if a person has a condition that is
not substantially limiting, like acne, but is treated by their employer as being limited, that
satisfies the "regarded as" test. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1994).
76 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).
77 H.R. REP. No. 485(H1), supra note 4, at 53, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA-N. at 335; 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1994). The regulation specifically cites discrimination problems associ-
ated with persons infected with M1V. Id. See School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273 (1987). In Arline, the United States Supreme Court explained that impairments
which do not substantially limit a person's functioning may nevertheless substantially
limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others. Id. at 283.
78 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX4) (Supp. V 1993). Discrimination under the ADA includes, "ex-
cluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the
known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a
relationship or association." Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. The ADA prohibits an employer from relying on an employee's association or rela-
tionship with a disabled person as a basis for discriminating against such employee. Id.
The legislative history reflects the concern that employers might discriminate against peo-
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It should be clear that an employer who terminates or otherwise dis-
criminates against an employee because the employer mistakenly be-
lieved that the employee was disabled still violates the ADA if it turns
out that the employee was not actually disabled. Recently, the EEOC
filed its first lawsuit in Chicago. 8' This case involved an executive who
told his employer he had terminal brain cancer.8 2 Though the employee
could still perform his job function, the employer terminated him imme-
diately,83 believing that he was disabled and unable to perform job func-
tions.8' The illness, however, was being treated, and was in remission
by the time the case was in front of the jury. 5 The employee had a
claim, even though he was not technically disabled, because the em-
ployer made a mistake by regarding him as disabled and terminating
him. As a result, the jury awarded the employee compensatory and pu-
nitive damages totalling $222,000.86
B. "Reasonable Accomodation"
1. Persons Entitled to "Reasonable Accomodation"
An additional consideration with respect to these three new catego-
ries of people who are considered disabled under Title I, and who were
not previously protected as disabled under the Rehabilitation Act or
state and local laws, arises in the situation of a person who resides or
associates with a disabled person. 7 It is clear that reasonable accommo-
dation may be required when employing an otherwise qualified person
with a disability.88 However, must an employer reasonably accommo-
date an employee who is associated with a disabled person? Assume, for
example, a teacher in a parish tells her employer that her son, who has
cerebral palsy, is undergoing intensive physical therapy and a series of
surgeries. In order to facilitate the treatment, she needs to arrive late
every day because the hospital only has morning physical therapy. In
addition, the teacher makes a request to leave early over the next several
ple who have cared for, or lived with, people who are disabled, particularly people with
AIDS. H.R. REP. No. 485(111), supra note 18, at 39, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. at 461.
81 EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. 111. 1993).
The EEOC does not always bring a lawsuit on behalf of an aggrieved individual. How-
ever, the EEOC always has the right of "first refusal" which it will exercise in cases of
notoriety or cases involving an evolving issue or rule. That is also true under the ADA.
82 The factual arguments of both parties was not described in the final opinion. For an
early ruling on a summary judgment that includes a complete statement of the facts, see
EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
83 820 F. Supp. at 1060.
84 Id. at 1064.
85 Id. at 1063-64.
86 AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. at 581.
87 See supra note 79.
88 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
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weeks. Under an ADA analysis, the considerations are: (1) the employee
is known to be associated with someone that is disabled;8 9 and (2) the
ADA provides that an employer cannot discriminate against an other-
wise qualified individual based on their association with someone that is
disabled.9 ° A close reading of the statute, however, indicates whether
the employer's duty to provide reasonable accommodation for the em-
ployee9 1 extend this far.
Although reasonable accommodations are generally required unless
they present an undue hardship, the statute specifically applies only to
otherwise disabled individuals who are also the "applicant or em-
ployee."92 Therefore, reasonable accomodations are required only if the
applicant or employee is disabled.9" While the statute provides that a
person cannot be discriminated against on the basis of their being associ-
ated with a disabled person, it solely prohibits discrimination as far as
terms and conditions of employment.94 Thus, the statute does not im-
pose an affirmative obligation upon the employer to provide reasonable
accommodation to an employee based upon their association with a dis-
abled person.95
2. "Reasonable Accommodation" Defined
Many interpretive problems arise in determining a "reasonable ac-
commodation." The EEOC has given some guidance in this area. While
the ADA does not define the term, it offers some illustrations of what
may be considered "reasonable."96 Remember, however, that the jury is
89 Id. § 12112(bX4).
90 Id. § 12112(a).
91 Id. § 12112(bX5XA).
.92 Id. Subsection 12112(b)(5XA) provides:
Discrimination includes - not making reasonable accommodation to the
known physical or mental limitation of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operator of the business of such covered entity;
Id. (emphasis added).
93 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5XA) (Supp. V 1993).
94 Id. § 12112(a).
95 The legislative history of the ADA notes that an employer may discipline or discharge
an employee who violates a neutral attendance policy, even if the absences are required to
care for a disabled spouse. H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 4, at 61, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 344. Unlike the employer's obligation towards a disabled employee, an
employer has no duty to provide reasonable accommodation to non-disabled employees. Id.
at 61-62, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 344; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8 (1994.).
96 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. V 1993). The list includes job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignments, acquisition or modification of examination, train-
ing materials or policies, and qualified readers or interpreters. Id.
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ultimately going to decide whether an accommodation is "reasonable,"97
unless the accommodation is more personal than job related.9"
The EEOC provides a number of factors to consider in determining
the "reasonableness" of an accommodation. These fall into three basic
categories.99 The first category is the cost to the employer. An employee
may want his desk raised so that his wheelchair can slide under it. This
may entail either buying a desk that can be raised at a cost of $200 to
$300, or mechanically raising the existing desk so the employee can slide
his wheelchair underneath. It is estimated that eighty-nine percent of
all accommodations will cost less than $1,000.100 However, an employee
who is a quadriplegic may need a special computer that works on voice
command, which may cost $5,000 or $6,000. If that employee holds a
data processor job or some type of data input job for which he is paid
$12,000 or $13,000 a year, such an accommodation may cause the busi-
ness to suffer undue hardship. 10 ' However, even if the cost of the accom-
modation exceeds the employee's salary, the employer may not automati-
cally refuse the accommodation on this basis alone.' 0 2 The employer
must offer to pay a portion of the cost that does not amount to an undue
hardship if an agency or the employee is willing to pay the remainder.10 3
The second category is the overall financial resources of the. em-
ployer.104 Again, the "single employer" issue for determining who the
employer is becomes important.-0 5 For instance, the employer could be
the school for whom that staff member works, the parish as a whole, or
the diocese.' 0 6 The EEOC directs that the financial resources of the site
97 Determining a "reasonable accommodation" requires a fact specific, case-by-case in-
quiry. H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 4, at 62, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. at 344.
98 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1994). Reasonable accommodations must specifically assist the indi-
vidual in performing their particular job, but not necessarily assist the individual in his
daily activities. Id.; see Shaller, supra note 65, at 432-42.
99 42 U.S.C. § 12111(1OXB) (Supp. V 1993). Basically, the test of "reasonableness" con-
cerns whether providing the accommodation will cause the employer to suffer undue hard-
ship. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Undue hardship is determined by examining several factors,
including- the nature and cost of the accommodation; the financial resources of the facility
and the covered entity; the number of employees; and the geographical administrator or
fiscal relationship between the facility and the covered entity. Id. § 12111(10)(B); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.15(d) (1994).
100 See Tracy Hart, The Americans with Disabilities Act Title I: Equal Employment Rights
for Disabled Americans, 18 DAYTON L. REV. 921, 941 (1993).
101 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10XA), (B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
102 The regulations expressly reject any defense to accommodate based on a comparison of
the cost of an accommodation and the salary of the accommodated individual. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.15(d) (1994).
103 Id. § 1630.2 (p).
104 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10XB) (Supp. V 1993).
105 See supra notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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where the individual works be examined or, if there are numerous sites,
that the financial resources of the larger entity be looked at.' Where
the employing entity is a subsidiary of a parent company, the EEOC di-
rects examination of the resources available to the parent company.' 08
Even where an employer has set up distinctive corporate entities to sepa-
rate and insulate the parent company from liability and responsibility
for employment-related expenses, under the single employer doctrine,
those separate entities might be considered as one in determining undue
hardship issues. 10 9
Also, generally, employers do not want a jury in a public hearing to
be confronted with evidence of its financial resources to determine
whether an accomodation is "reasonable." From a litigation standpoint,
if an employer denies an employee's requested accommodation on the
ground that it costs too much, the employer should know that its finan-
cial resources are fair game at trial.
The last factor is the size of the entity and number of persons it em-
ploys. Large employers, in particular, will have a difficult task demon-
strating that any accommodation is an undue hardship.
110
In general, the guidelines for determining a "reasonable accommoda-
tion" are vague. The intent of Congress was that the determination be
made on a case-by-case basis.11' Similarly, the EEOC suggests that an
analysis of a "reasonable accommodation" is "best determined by a flexi-
ble, interactive process."112 The determination becomes fact intensive,
based on the type of accommodation that the employee needs as balanced
against the resources of the company. It should be noted that there are
very few published ADA decisions on this issue, and the few available
have not provided practical guidance. Employers should be mindful of
these issues when taking discipline against an employee. At that early
stage, the attorney should discuss with the employer which issues the
employer is likely to succeed with before a jury.
107 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10XB). A factor to be considered in this analysis is whether the facil-
ity is financially independent from the other sites or a parent company. If financial inde-
pendence exists, an examination into that facilities' resources alone may be considered. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (1994).
108 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).
109 H.R. REP. No. 485(11), supra note 4, at 40-41, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 463-64.
Congress noted that both the resources of the local facility and the parent company will be
relevant to the undue hardship determination. Id.
110 See Lawrence P. Postal & David D. Kadue, An Employer's Guide to the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 LABOR L.J. 323, 338 (1991).
111 See supra note 97.
112 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1994).
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III. HIRING PROCEDURES
Another issue of concern with the ADA is the use of medical exami-
nations for employment. The act clearly prohibits pre-employment medi-
cal examinations."' Parishes and schools that previously ordered physi-
cals as a means of screening out workers compensation risks cannot do
so anymore. Post-offer employment physical examinations are allowed if
not discriminatory. 11' As a general rule, questions on job applications or
inquiries made during interviews regarding physical limitations are pro-
hibited by the ADA. 1 5 Similarly, an employer cannot ask potential em-
ployees on job applications or during the interview process whether they
suffer from any disability. 16 Asking applicants to list illnesses or inju-
ries that they have is prohibited, even if asked only from a safety
standpoint." 7
After an applicant is hired, if the employer believes there is some-
thing the school nurse or front office should know about an employee,
that information can be solicited separately and must be maintained sep-
arate from the personnel ffle. l l8 For example, inquiring whether the-
new employee has any allergies, in the event there could be some medi-
cal emergency, would be permissible if the employee's response was kept
separate from the employment records.
The EEOC Manual contains- recommendations for an approach to
asking questions regarding the applicant's medical status. 1 9 Although
some disabilities are not obvious upon sight, the employer need not be
left guessing whether the interviewee has any physical conditions that
may limit his ability to perform essential functions of the job. The EEOC
guidelines allow the employer to take a written job description that lists
the essential functions of the job, hand it to the applicant during either
the application or interview process, and ask the applicant whether he or
she can perform the job either with or without accommodation. 120 That
is the full extent to which an employer can make this type of inquiry.
113 42 U.S.C. § 12112(dX2XA) (Supp. V 1993). Pre-employment medical examinations of
job applicants are prohibited by the ADA. Id. However, certain agility tests that are not
considered medical tests may be given at any time, as long as all applicants are tested. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.14(a).
114 42 U.S.C. § 12112(dX3) (Supp. V 1993). Once an offer is extended, an employer may
conduct a medical examination or ask health related questions as long as all offerees are
required to do so. Id
115 Id. § 12112(dXl).
116 Id. § 12112(dX2XA).
117 EEOC MANuAL, supra note 55, at § 5.5(b).
118 42 U.S.C. § 12112(dX3XB) (Supp. V 1993). The information in the files would only be
released if necessary for treatment, to provide accommodation, or for a government investi-
gation. Id.
119 EEOC MANUAL, supra note 55, at § 5.5.
120 Id. at § 5.5; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4XB) (Supp. V 1993).
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However, if the applicant responds that he or she could perform the job,
but only with accommodation, the employer may follow up to determine
how the applicant would do the job and the type of accommodation that
would be required. But, again, if the applicant simply answers "no," the
questioning must stop there. The employer is protected from most
claims because the ADA only requires reasonable accommodation of
known disabilities.121 It is, therefore, essential for employers to have
some process in place to demonstrate to the EEOC or a jury that they
attempted to solicit from the employee information regarding any accom-
modation they may require. If the employee does not disclose the need
for accommodation, the employer is not at fault and cannot be later ac-
cused of discriminating against that employee. 122
IV. LITIGATION TECHNIQUES
Attorneys defending an employer against an ADA Title I lawsuit
should keep in mind three basic but important points, and should re-
member that an ADA lawsuit is essentially similar to a civil rights
case. 123 The first point to examine in a lawsuit under Title I is whether
the employee exhausted administrative remedies.' 24 Unlike other titles
of the ADA 125 Title I requires. that, an -employee file an administrative
charge of discrimination with the EEOC before going into federal
court. 12 6 The employee can file a suit only after the EEOC has issued
that person a right-to-sue letter.'2 7
The second important point, as has been illustrated in age discrimi-
nation and Title VII cases, is to scrutinize the timeliness of the claim.
Under Title I of the ADA, an employee has 180 days within which to file
a disability claim with EEOC.'12  By contrast, in a state such as Virginia
which has a Fair Employment Practices Agency that is empowered to
121 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5XA) (Supp. V 1993). Reasonable accommodation is only required
if the physical or mental limitation is known to the employer. Id.
122 Id.
123 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 2000e-5 (Supp. V 1993).
124 Id. § 12117(a). By express reference, the ADA incorporates the enforcement provision
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. Under Title VII, a claimant needs a right-to-
sue letter to bring suit in federal court. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(). The claimant must have origi-
nally notified the EEOC of the discriminatory act within 180 days of its occurrence. Id.
The EEOC has the choice of settling the claim, initiating a lawsuit, dropping the matter, or
issuing a right-to-sue letter. Id.
125 Id. § 12133. Claims under the ADA prohibiting discrimination in public services do not
require the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id.; see Noland v. Wheatley, 835 F.
Supp. 476, 482 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (noting claim under Title II of ADA does not require ex-
haustion of administrative remedies).
126 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
127 Id.
128 Id. §§ 12117(a), 2000e-5(e).
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investigate violations of disabilities laws, the employee has 300 days
within which to file a discrimination claim. 129 Employers should not
overlook the timeliness defense where applicable. Some plaintiff's attor-
neys think that 180 days is equal to 6 months, which is not the same
since some months have more than 30 days. Although this may seem
like an insignificant, procedural technicality, the law in all the federal
circuits is that 180 days means 180 days, and if the claim is filed on the
18 1st day, the court is denied subject matter jurisdiction.'" 0 The same
principle applies with the 300 day filing requirement in states with fair
practice employment agencies. Similarly, with respect to right-to-sue
letters, 13 once the EEOC completes its administrative investigation and
gives an employee a right-to-sue letter, the employee has 90 days within
which to file suit.' 3 2 It is important for attorneys to be aware of these
specific time limitations as these lawsuits arise.
The time period within which to file a claim with the EEOC begins
on the date of the actual discriminatory act-the date the employee was
informed he or she was fired, denied a promotion, or demoted. 133 The 90.
days within which to fie suit in federal court starts running the day that
the employee receives the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.'
3 1
The third point to remember is to compare the claims in the lawsuit
against the claims in the administrative charge that was filed with the
EEOC. If an employee makes allegations in a lawsuit that were not
129 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(aX4Xii) (1994). The state's agency must have subject matter
jurisdiction over the charges of discrimination for the extended timeliness provision to ap-
ply. Id.
130 See Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting filing requirements of
EEOC similar to statute of limitations in that failure to comply in a timely manner bars
plaintiff from a civil remedy), aff'd, 898 F.2d 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 869 (1990);
accord Love v. Alamance County Bd. of Educ., 581 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.C. 1984), aff'd 757
F.2d 1504 (4th Cir. 1985); Rasimus v. Michigan Dep't of Health, 714 F.2d 614 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984).
131 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b)(1) (1994).
Where the Commission has found reasonable cause to believe that Title VII or
the ADA has been violated, has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance
with Title VII or the ADA and where the Commission has decided not to bring a
civil action against the respondent, it will issue a notice of right to sue on the
charge as described in § 1601.28(e) to: [the aggrieved party].
Id.
132 See id. § 1601.28(e)(1). "The notice of authorization of right to sue shall include: (1)
authorization to the aggrieved person to bring a civil action under.., the ADA... within
90 days of receipt of such authorization." Id.
133 See id. § 1601.13(a)(1). "Such charges are timely filed if received by the Commission
within 180 days from the date of the alleged violation." Id.
134 The EEOC sends the right-to-sue letter by certified mail and gets a green card that the
employee signs upon receipt. This is often the source of side litigations because, many
times, the employee's family member signed for receipt, leading to a factual dispute as to
when the employee got notice and when the 90 days started running.
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raised before the EEOC in an administrative charge of discrimination,
those allegations should be stricken by the court.135 This situation com-
monly arises when parties are added to a lawsuit. For example, assume
a teacher who was fired files a disability complaint against St. Peter's
parish with the EEOC. The charge is investigated and the EEOC finds
probable cause. Assume further that the teacher retains counsel and
files suit against St. Peter's parish, naming either the diocese or the
Bishop individually as parties. The parish's first technical argument is
that, since the teacher did not name the diocese or Bishop in the charge
of discrimination before the EEOC, the teacher did not exhaust the ad-
ministrative remedies available with respect to the diocese or the
Bishop.' 36 This is a valid defense and one that the employer's attorney
should raise vigorously.
Moreover, employers charged with violating Title I of the ADA
should be warned against responding without counsel. The employer
may have responded to EEOC charges before and obtained a "no prob-
able cause" determination. 13 7 This is dangerous because the EEOC's
written determination is admissible at trial in federal court.'38 If an em-
ployee is successful in obtaining a "probable cause" determination, this
evidence can be very compelling to a jury, despite the fact that the em-
ployee must still prove a valid case.
V. TiTLE III OF THE ADA. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND
CoMMRIcAL FAcILrIEs
Title III contains provisions of the ADA covering public accommoda-
tions and commercial facilities. 139 This provision of the ADA received a
135 See id. § 1601.21(a). "A determination finding reasonable cause is based on, and lim-
ited to, evidence obtained in the Commission and does not reflect any judgment on the
merits of allegations not addressed in the determination." Id.
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. V 1993) (noting that remedies and procedures avail-
able under ADA are identical to procedures of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-4 to (e)-9); see also Kent
v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Elementary and Secondary Educ. and Div. of Vocational Re-
habilitation, 792 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (dismissing without prejudice plaintiff who
did not comply with requirements of Title VII).
137 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (1994). 'Where the Commission completes its investigation of
a charge and finds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employ-
ment practice has occurred or is occurring as to all issues addressed in the determination,
the Commission shall issue a letter of determination to all the parties to the charge indicat-
ing the finding." Id.
138 FED. R. Evm. 402 (admitting "[all relevant evidence"); FED. R. Evmn. 803(8) (excepting
public reports from exclusion by hearsay rule).
139 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (Supp. V 1993); see also id. § 12181(2). Subsection
12181(2) defines "commercial facility" as "facilities - (A) that are intended for non-residen-
tial use; and (B) whose operations will effect commerce" and "public accommodation" as
"[specific enumerated examples]." Id.
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splash of publicity by requiring restaurants, hotels, shopping centers,
and professional offices to make their facilities accessible to the dis-
abled.140 Title III treats public accommodations differently than com-
mercial facilities. Commercial facilities are basically anything that is
not a public accommodation and is nonresidential in nature, including
office buildings, factories, and warehouses. 14 1 Although both must ad-
here to regulations pertaining to new construction and alteration,
142
only public accommodation facilities are subject to Title III's provisions
addressing the removal of existing barriers."
A. Application to Religious Organizations
Before addressing the nuances of Title III's main provisions, it
should be noted that an exemption for religious organizations is provided
for in section 307 of Title III of the ADA. 4 4 Based on the list of public
accommodations covered by the ADA, it would appear that many of the
entities run by the Catholic Church, such as day care centers, schools,
and nursing homes, would be covered as public accommodations.
45
The general rule, however, is that the provisions do not apply to reli-
gious entities. Section 307 states: "The provisions of this Title shall not
apply to . . . religious organizations or entities controlled by religious
organizations ..... 1 This section thus provides two exceptions: (1).reli-
gious organizations, and (2) entities controlled by religious organiza-
tions.147 Unfortunately, there is no case law to guide practitioners in the
construction and application of the exceptions. For instance, the section
307 exemption for "entities controlled by religious organizations"
148
does not clarify whether the entities controlled by religious organizations
must be "religious" entities.
To illustrate the potential issues raised by this language, assume a
parishioner leaves a will devising a gas station to the Church. A gas
station, at first glance, is a place of public accommodation otherwise cov-
ered by Title III of the ADA; however, if the gas station is controlled by a
religious organization, it is arguably exempt from Title III's coverage
140 See Peter A. Susser, The ADA- Dramatically Expanded Federal Rights for Disabled
Americans, 16 EMPL. REL. L.J. 157, 169 (noting significant implications of Title III of ADA).
141 See 42 U.S.C. § 121181(2) (Supp. V 1993).
142 See id. § 12183.
143 See id. § 12182.
144 Id. § 12187 (exempting private clubs and religious organizations).
145 Entities such as day care centers, schools, nursing homes, office buildings, and recto-
ries would normally fit under the statute's definitions of "public accommodation" and 'com-
mercial facility."
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (Supp. V 1993).
147 See id.
148 See id.
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under a literal reading of section 307. Although this argument is likely
to be unsuccessful, in its regulations, the Department of Justice 149 takes
a position that the religious exemption'should be interpreted broadly.'" 0
The regulations indicate that religious organizations are exempt
even when the religious organization is carrying out activities that would
otherwise make it a public accommodation. The regulation gives exam-
ples, including a religious organization that runs a day care center open
to the public, a nursing home, and a diocesan school system. All of those
entities, although not necessarily religious in nature, are exempt if they
are "controlled" by a religious organization. This holds true even if the
entity has lay people on its board. The Justice Department makes an
important distinction when a religious organization leases a portion of
its facility to an entity that it does not control. For instance, consider a
day care center that leases space in the basement of a Church school and
is not controlled in any way by the parish. The Justice Department con-
siders that entity, not the Church, subject to Title III of the ADA.
B. Provisions of Title III
. There are three main provisions of importance under Title III. First,
there are the new construction requirements.15' The general rule is that
all construction of new facilities built for initial occupancy after January
26, 1993 must be designed and constructed in full compliance with the
ADA accessibility guidelines issued by the Department of Justice. 5 2
The Department of Justice regulations contain pictures and dimensions
of the size of bathroom stalls, heights of drinking fountains, width of
149 In the same way that Title I of the ADA is administered by the EEOC, id. § 12117(a)
(referring to incorporating enforcement procedures of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1988)), Title III
is administered by the Department of Justice. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (incorporating en-
forcement procedures.of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a), which refers to enforcement by Attorney
General).
Unlike Title I, however, there are no administrative remedies that must be sought in
the Department of Justice. The aggrieved party can file a Title III suit in federal court
right away. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1988).
[Wihenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe
that any person is about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by section
2000a-2 of this title, a civil action for preventive relief including an application
for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may
be instituted by the person aggrieved and, upon timely application, the court
may, in its discretion, permit the Attorney General to intervene in such civil
action if he certifies the case is of general public importance.
Id.
150 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.102(e) (1993).
151 See 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (Supp. V 1993).
152 Id. Discrimination is defined as including "a failure to design and construct facilities
for first occupancy later than 30 months after July 26, 1990 that are readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities." Id. at § 12183(aXl).
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handicapped accessible parking spots, and length of curb parking.1 5
The design requirements are not discretionary. Designers and architects
are generally familiar with these regulations and the requirements are
clearly elaborated. Nevertheless, attorneys should be aware of the regu-
lations in the unlikely event an architect fails to conform.
In contrast to new construction-which must comply strictly with
the architectural guidelines and requirements-there are existing facili-
ties that are inaccessible or that contain standing barriers to the dis-
abled. The general rule for existing buildings is that, as of January
1992,154 all architectural and communication barriers must be removed
from existing facilities where such removal is readily achievable.' 5 The
guidelines given by the Department of Justice for determining whether
the barrier removal is "readily achievable"'5 6 are close to the EEOC
guidelines discussed earlier for determining "reasonable accommoda-
tions."157 The first factor is the cost of removing the barriers; the second
factor is the financial resources of the entity involved; and the third fac-
tor, unique to Title III, pertains to safety issues that may be involved. 5 '
Realizing that most entities have limited financial resources, the Depart-
153 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 (1993) (regarding removal of barriers).
154 See id. § 36.508(a).
155 See id. § 36.302(a).
A public accommodation shall make reasonable modifications in policies, prac-
tices, or procedures, when the modifications are necessary to afford goods, serv-
ices, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with
disabilities, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facil-
ities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.
Id. See also id. § 36.304.
A public accommodation shall remove architectural barriers in existing facili-
ties including communication barriers that are structural in nature, where
such removal is readily achievable, i.e., easily accomplishable and able to be
carried out without much difficulty or expense."
Id.
156 See id. § 36.104.
157 See Susser, supra note 140, at 165 (reviewing EEOC guidelines).
158 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1993):
Readily Achievable means easily accomplishable and able to be carried out
without much difficulty or expense. In determining whether an action is read-
ily achievable factors to be considered include -
(1) The nature and cost of the action needed under this part;
(2) The overall financial resources of the site or sites involved in the action; the
number of persons employed at the site; the effect on expenses and resources;
legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation, including
crime prevention measures; or the impact otherwise of the action upon the op-
eration of the site.
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ment of Justice has prioritized the steps for barrier removal. 159 The first
priority is providing access to the building.' 60 The second priority is pro-
viding access to goods and services available to the public.' 6 ' The third
priority is providing access to public rest rooms.
16 2
Requirements for alterations to existing facilities,' 6 3 including re-
modeling, renovating, and structural modifications, 16 4 are less flexible
than new building construction, but more rigid than the removal of pri-
oritized barriers. Normal maintenance tasks such as re-roofing, paint-
ing, and wallpapering are excluded.' 6 5 The general rule is that, when
alterations to an existing facility are made, the altered portion must, to
the maximum extent feasible, comply with the Department of Justice's
architectural regulations.'
66
Finally, there is what is known as a "path-of-travel obligation" under
Title III of the ADA.' 67 When alterations are performed, a clear, accessi-
ble path must be created, if one does not already exist, between a pri-
mary area' 6 8-an area primarily used within a facility such as a lobby of
a bank, a secretary's desk, or the offices of attorneys-and bathrooms,
drinking fountains, and telephones.' 6 9 The Department of Justice is-
159 See id. § 36.304(c) (listing priorities).
160 See id. § 36.304(c)(1).
161 See id. § 36.304(c)(2).
162 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(cX3) (1993).
163 See id. § 36.402(a) (defining alterations).
164 See id. § 36.402(bX1).
165 Id.
166 See id. § 36.402(aX1).
(1) Any alteration to a place of public accommodation or a commercial facility,
after January 26, 1992, shall be made so as to ensure that, to the maximum
extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use
wheelchairs. -
Id.
167 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.403 (1993).
168 Primary areas of a facility are referred to in the Department of Justice regulations as
"an area of a facility that contains a primary function." Id. § 36.403(b). A "primary func-
tion" is defined as "a major activity for which that facility is intended." Id. Examples given
include the "customer services lobby of a bank, the dining area of a cafeteria, the meeting
rooms in a conference center." Id. Areas excluded from this definition include "boiler
rooms, storage rooms, employee lounges or locker rooms, janitorial closets, entrances, corri-
dors, and restrooms." Id.
169 See id. § 36.403(a).
An alteration that affects or could affect the usability of or access to an area of a
facility that contains a primary function shall be made so as to ensure that, to
the maximum extent feasible, the path of travel to the altered area and the
restrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area, are
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including indi-.
viduals who use wheelchairs, unless the cost and scope of such alteration is
disproportionate to the cost of the overall alteration.
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sued cost guidelines which relieve a building when the cost of setting up
a path of travel from the primary area exceeds twenty percent of the
overall cost of the alteration.'17  Assume, for example, that a building
owner is renting half of one floor to "DJ's Ambulance Service." DJ's sub-
sequently moves out of the building. The owner decides to renovate the
space in order to attract a law firm as a new tenant. The cost to alter
that primary area is $10,000. Under the Department of Justice regula-
tion, the owner would not have to spend more than $2,000 to do
whatever it takes to insure a path of travel to the restrooms, telephones,
and drinking fountains.
1 71
CONCLUSION
Precautionary planning and compliance with the guidelines of the
ADA provisions discussed will ensure that religious organizations do not
leave themselves unnecessarily exposed to adverse claims and remedies
when dealing with employment relationships outside the ministry. As
the Church keeps pace with modern-day practical requirements, such as
incorporation, and provides services overlapping the commercial sphere
while employing lay persons, it is incumbent upon the parishes and dio-
ceses to be cognizant of the statutory environment that is being entered.
Id.
170 See id. § 36.403(f)(1) ("Alterations made to provide an accessible path of travel to the
altered area will be deemed disproportionate to the overall alteration when the cost exceeds
20% of the cost of the alteration to the primary function area").
171 Id.

